Pricing multi-interval economic dispatch of electric power under operational uncertainty is considered in this twopart paper. Part I investigates dispatch-following incentives of profit-maximizing generators using general and partial equilibrium models. It is shown that, under operational uncertainty, no uniform-pricing scheme provides dispatch-following incentives that avoid discriminative out-of-the-market uplifts when ramping constraints are binding. An extension of LMP, referred to as temporal locational marginal pricing (TLMP) is proposed that takes into account both generation and ramping-induced opportunity costs. Although discriminative, TLMP satisfies a set of strong equilibrium conditions under which the rolling-window economic dispatch and TLMP policies guarantee dispatch-following incentives under arbitrary load forecast errors. Part II of the paper extends the theoretical results developed in Part I to more general network settings and investigates the performance of several benchmark mechanisms under both ideal and practical forecasting models.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider the problem of pricing multi-interval lookahead economic dispatch when generators are constrained by ramping limits and demand forecasts inaccurate. This work is motivated by recent discussions among system operators on the need for ramping products in response to the "duckcurve" effect of renewable integrations [1] - [6] . A welldesigned multi-interval look-ahead dispatch that anticipates trends of future demand can minimize the use of expensive reserves [7] .
A standard implementation of a look-ahead dispatch is the so-called rolling-window dispatch where the operator optimizes the dispatch over a few scheduling intervals into the future based on load forecasts. The dispatch for the immediate scheduling interval (a.k.a. the binding interval) is implemented; the dispatch for the subsequent intervals serves as an advisory signal and updated sequentially.
In pricing rolling-window dispatch, standard practice is the rolling-window version of the locational marginal pricing (LMP). LMP is a uniform pricing mechanism across generators and demands at the same location in the same scheduling interval. It sets the price of electricity by the marginal cost of generation. In the absence of ramping limits, LMP has salient properties: it supports efficient competitive market equilibria such that a profit-maximizing generator has no incentive to deviate from the dispatch signal from the operator. LMP also guarantees revenue adequacy. As a uniform pricing scheme, LMP is transparent to all market participants, and the price can be computed easily as a by-product of economic dispatch.
Most attractive features of LMP are lost, unfortunately, when generation ramping constraints are binding and demand forecasts inaccurate. No longer a marginal generator that operates away from its generation capacity sets the price by its marginal cost of generation. Such a generator may have to hold back its generation in order to provide ramping support for the system to meet the demand in future intervals. In doing so, the generator may incur an opportunity cost and be scheduled to generate at an LMP below its marginal cost of generation. Although under LMP, in the absence of load forecast errors, the loss in one interval may be compensated by generations in more profitable intervals in the future, LMPs computed with forecast errors do not guarantee that the anticipated higher payments be realized in the future. At the end of all scheduling, a generator could have earned more had it deviated from the dispatch signal. Examples of such scenarios are well known and also illustrated in Sec V and in [8] .
To incentivize generators to follow operators dispatch, the operator may have to provide an uplift payment to those generators suffering from underpayments. The roles of such type of out-of-the-market settlements have been discussed extensively in the literature [9] - [11] . The out-of-the-market settlements are discriminative and lack transparency. They also affect the revenue adequacy of the operator.
A. Related work
A key challenge in pricing multi-interval economic dispatch is the lack of dispatch-following incentives when rolling-window dispatch is used with inaccurate demand forecasts. The incentive issues with some of the existing pricing schemes, such as LMP, have been widely discussed in the literature [2] , [6] , [12] - [15] .
Several marginal cost pricing schemes have been proposed for the rolling-window dispatch policies. The flexible ramp-ing product (FRP) [3] treats ramping as a product to be procured and priced uniformly as part of the real-time dispatch. FRP is a two-part tariff consisting of the prices of energy and ramping. Ela and O'Malley proposed the cross-interval marginal price (CIMP) in [12] . CIMP is defined by the sum of marginal costs at the binding interval with respect to the demand in the biding and the future (advisory) intervals. Multi-settlement pricing schemes are proposed in [15] , [16] that generalize the existing two-settlement pricing scheme for the day-ahead and real-time markets. The payment for generation at time t is determined by a sequence of LMPs computed from the rolling-window dispatch policies.
Deviating from marginal cost pricing are two recent proposals aimed at minimizing (but not eliminating) the outof-the-market payments, both employing optimizations different from that used in the economic dispatch. The pricepreserving multi-interval pricing (PMP), originally suggested in [17] and formalized in [14] , adds to the objective function the loss of opportunity cost for the generators for the past energy prices and dispatch decisions. In PMP, past dispatch quantities are treated as decision variables. In contrast, the constraint-preserving multi-interval pricing (CMP) proposed in [14] fixes the past dispatch decisions and penalizes ramping violations. Both have shown improvements over the standard rolling-window LMP policy.
Virtually all existing pricing schemes for multi-interval economic dispatch are uniform pricing mechanisms. To our best knowledge, no existing pricing policies can provide dispatch-following incentives that eliminate discriminative out-of-the-market settlements.
B. Summary of results, contexts, and limitations
The main contribution of this work is threefold. First, we adopt a competitive equilibrium model to analyze dispatchfollowing incentives for generators * . For the multi-interval dispatch model, one can treat the generation/consumption in different scheduling intervals as separate (but dependent) markets. Two types of market equilibrium models are considered. The general equilibrium model considers all markets jointly whereas the partial equilibrium model focuses on one market with fixed prices and productions in all others. Under the general equilibrium model, a generator has no incentive to deviate from its dispatch given the equilibrium prices for all scheduling intervals. Under the partial equilibrium model, on the other hand, a generator has no incentive to deviate from the dispatch signal for the scheduled interval, independent of prices in other scheduling intervals.
In the absence of forecast uncertainty, LMP and the multi-interval economic dispatch form a general equilibrium. Consequently, no generator would deviate from the dispatch however unfavorable the price in a particular interval may appear. The dispatch and LMP in a particular interval, * We restrict ourselves to inelastic demands. The theory developed here can be extended for inelastic demands. however, do not necessarily form a partial equilibrium. When the rolling-window dispatch and pricing policies are used based on forecasted demand, a generator facing unfavorable prices in a particular interval may have incentives to deviate, especially when the generator may believe its own forecast is more accurate.
Second, we introduce the notion of a strong equilibrium that captures the dispatch-following incentive conditions under arbitrary load forecast errors. Specifically, a dispatch scheduling and pricing policies form a strong equilibrium if the dispatch-price pair forms a partial equilibrium for all scheduling intervals. The strong equilibrium prices encapsulate accurately the generation as well as the rampinginduced opportunity costs such that there is no incentive for a generator not to follow the dispatch in all scheduling intervals.
We begin with a negative result: no-uniform pricing mechanism guarantees dispatch-following incentives under the rolling-window dispatch model. This means that, under all uniform pricing schemes, a generator may be under-paid in ex-post; it has incentives to deviate when facing unfavorable prices. Although nondiscriminatory, uniform pricing in multiinterval dispatch becomes discriminative when out-of-themarket uplifts are applied.
We then derive a nonuniform version of LMP, referred to as temporal locational marginal price (TLMP). The key intuition of TLMP is to encapsulate both generation and ramping-induced opportunity costs in each scheduling interval. As a result, TLMP always satisfies the strong equilibrium condition regardless the accuracy of the load forecast. To our best knowledge, TLMP is the first multi-period pricing policy that guarantees dispatch-following incentives under arbitrary load forecast error, thus completely eliminating the need for the out-of-the-market uplift.
Given that TLMP is discriminatory, one may question how different is it from other discriminative pricing schemes such as the pay-as-bid (PAB) pricing? The differences between TLMP and PAB pricing are significant. As an extension of LMP, TLMP enjoys the same incentive compatibility advantage of LMP over PAB pricing under the ideal perfect competition assumptions [18] , [19] . We illustrate further in [8] that TLMP not only retains the incentives for truthful bidding in generation cost, it also appears to provide incentives for truthful reporting of ramping constraints. This latter property is lacking in most existing schemes, including the rolling-window LMP policy. In practice, however, the pricetaking assumption for the generators may be unrealistic, and market power under LMP may exist [20] .
Finally, in Part II of the paper, we generalize the theory of dispatch-following incentives to a more general models and examine the performance of LMP, TLMP, and several existing multi-interval pricing schemes proposed in the literature. When comparing different pricing schemes, we aim to shed light on practical tradeoffs along several dimensions: generator profits, consumer payments, incentive following capabilities measured by the level of out-of-the-market settlements, the level of price discrimination, and incentives of truthful reporting of ramping capacity.
A few words are in order on the scope and limitations of this paper. In Part I, we restrict ourselves to a singlebus model without imposing network constraints so as not to tangle ramping and congestion problems. The demand is inelastic without ramping constraints. We ignore the role of unit commitment, the costs of reserve, and the possibility of involving nonlinear power flow. We provide only a toy example as a numerical illustration for the properties of LMP and TLMP. Generalizations to system with network constraints and more elaborate numerical examples are given in Part II.
C. Notations and nomenclature
A list of major designated symbols are listed in Table I. Otherwise, notations used here are standard. We use (x 1 , · · · , x N ) for a column vector and [x 1 , · · · , x N ] a row vector. All vectors are denoted by lower-case boldface letters; they are nominally column vectors unless specified otherwise. The transpose of vector x is denoted by x ⊺ . Matrices are boldface capital letters. Matrix X = [x ij ] is a matrix with x ij as its (i, j)th entry. Similar to the vector notation, matrix X = [x 1 , · · · , x N ] has x i as its ith column, and matrix
vector of all zeros and ones.
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II. MULTI-INTERVAL DISPATCH AND PRICING MODELS
Throughout this paper, we consider an electricity market involving one inelastic demand and N generators. The scheduling of generations involves T unit-length scheduling intervals H = {1, · · · , T }, where interval t covers the time interval [t, t+1). We call H the scheduling period. Typically, T is the total number of scheduling intervals in a day.
We introduce two multi-interval scheduling and pricing models: (i) the one-shot model that sets generations and prices in all intervals of the entire scheduling period at once, and (ii) the rolling-window model that sets generations and prices sequentially, one interval at a time by looking ahead several intervals into the future.
A. One-shot multi-interval dispatch and pricing policies
At t = 1, the operator obtains the demand forecastd = (d 1 , · · · ,d T ) over the entire scheduling period, whered t is the demand forecast for interval t. Let the actual demand be d = (d 1 , · · · , d T ). We assume that the forecast of the first interval is accurate, i.e.,d 1 = d 1 .
A one-shot dispatch schedules generations over H based on the initial forecastd. Let g it be the dispatch † of generator i in interval t, g i = (g i1 , · · · , g iT ) the dispatch for generator i over H , g[t] = (g 1t , · · · , g N t ) the dispatch for all generators in interval t, and the N × T matrix G = g [1] , · · · , g[T ] the dispatch matrix with g ⊺ i as its ith row. A one-shot dispatch policy G maps the demand forecast d 1 and the initial generation g[0] to a dispatch matrix G:
represents the generation level in the previous scheduling period; it imposes the initial ramping constraints on the generations in the first interval.
Similarly, a one-shot pricing policy P sets the prices in all intervals at once. A one-shot uniform price is defined by a vector π = (π 1 , · · · , π T ) with π t being the price of electricity in interval t for all generators and the demand. For a nonuniform pricing policy, P sets N price vectors with π i = (π i1 , · · · , π iT ) the price vector for generator i and π 0 the price vector for the demand.
B. One-shot economic dispatch and LMP
A special case of the one-shot dispatch is the multi-interval economic dispatch G ED that minimizes the total generation cost over H . Specifically, let the total generation cost be
where f it (·) is the cost function of generator i in interval t, assumed to be convex and differentiable for all t, i throughout the paper.
The dispatch policy G ED is defined by
subject to for all i and t ∈ H
whereḡ i the generation capacity, and (r i ,r i ) the down and up ramp-limits, λ t the dual variable for the equality constraints, and (ρ it ,ρ it , µ it ,μ it ) ≥ 0 are dual variables for inequality constraints.
The one-shot locational marginal price ‡ (LMP for short) is a uniform price π LMP = (π LMP t ) with π LMP t defined by the marginal cost of generation with respect to the demand in interval t. In particular, we have, by the envelop theorem,
where G ED and λ * t are part of a solution to (2) . Fig. 1 . At time t, the policy has a look-ahead scheduling window of W consecutive intervals, denoted by H t = {t, t + 1, · · · , t + W − 1}. The interval t is called the binding interval and the rest of H t the advisory intervals. As time t increases, H t slides across the entire scheduling period H .
C. Rolling-window look-ahead model
At time t, a W -interval one-shot policy G t maps demand forecastd t = (d t , · · · ,d t+W −1 ) and previously realized generation g R [t−1] to an N ×W forecasted generation matrix G t over H t :
The rolling window policy G R sets generation in interval t by g R [t] :=ĝ [t] . The rest of columns ofĜ t are not implemented. Binding interval
Advisory interval
PSfrag replacements Similarly, a rolling-window pricing policy P R is defined by a sequence one-shot pricing policies (P 1 , · · · , P T ). At time ‡ We retain the LMP terminology even though the model considered here does not involve a network. t, P t sets the prices over H t , and the price in the binding interval t is implemented by P R .
As an example, the rolling-window economic dispatch policy G R-ED = (G ED 1 , · · · , G ED T ) where G ED t is the W -window one-shot economic dispatch defined in (2) with T = W and d =d t . The rolling-window LMP policy P R-LMP is defined by (P LMP t ).
III. DISPATCH-FOLLOWING INCENTIVES AND UPLIFTS
We say that a pricing mechanism provides dispatchfollowing incentives if, given the realized prices over the entire scheduling period H , profit maximizing generators, by themselves, would have produced generations that match the dispatch signal from the operator.
We apply the market equilibrium theory to address issues of dispatch-following incentives. To this end, we consider two types incentives: (i) the ex-post incentive that covers the entire scheduling period H after all generations have been realized; (ii) the ex-ante incentive that covers only the current (binding) scheduling interval. The former guarantees dispatch-following incentives when a generator consider the total profit over the entire scheduling period whereas the latter guarantees dispatch-following incentives only for the binding interval.
A. Ex-post dispatch incentive and general equilibrium
For a multi-interval dispatch and pricing problem, we treat generation and consumption in each interval as a separate market; we thus have a set of T inter-dependent markets over H . When these markets are considered jointly, the notion of general equilibrium applies. We tailor the definition of Walrasian equilibrium [21, p. 547] for the multi-interval pricing problem as follows. See also [22, p. 10] .
Definition 1 (General equilibrium). Let d be the actual demand, g i the dispatch for generator i and π the vector of electricity prices over H . Let the N × T matrix G = (g ⊺ 1 , · · · , g ⊺ N ) be the realized generation matrix for all generators. We say (G, π) forms a general equilibrium if the following market clearing and individual rationality conditions are satisfied: 1) Market clearing condition:
2) Individual rationality condition: for all i, the dispatch g (i) = (g i1 , · · · , g iT ) is the solution of the individual profit maximization:
We call π an equilibrium price supporting generation G.
In the context of analyzing dispatch-following incentives, we are interested in whether the price signal π and dispatch signal G satisfy the general equilibrium condition. Because G is computed centrally, the market clearing condition is already satisfied; only individual rationality is needed.
It turns out that, in absence of forecasting uncertainty, the one-shot LMP supports the one-shot economic dispatch as stated in Theorem 1. This result is entirely analogous to the well-known property of LMP for the single period economic dispatch with network constraints [22] .
Theorem 1 (LMP as a General Equilibrium Price). When there is no forecast error,d = d, the one-shot economic dispatch matrix G ED and the one-shot LMP π LMP form a general equilibrium.
Note that being a general equilibrium price π LMP does not necessarily mean that that π LMP it g it ≥ f it (g it ) for all (i, t). In other words, a generator may be underpaid in some intervals despite that the generator is maximally compensated under π LMP over the entire scheduling period. See Sec. V.
B. Ex-ante dispatch incentives and partial equilibrium
When rolling-window dispatch is used, the forecasts in the look-ahead window (hence the dispatch over the window) change. This creates the missing payment problem even when the forecast over the look-ahead window is perfect.
Consider the example of rolling-window economic dispatch G R-ED and LMP P R-LMP policies. Suppose that a generator i is underpaid in interval t, i.e.,
it is generated by the W -window economic dispatch based on forecastd t , generator i expects the underpayment in interval t be compensated later in t ′ ∈ H t . At time t ′ , however, a different forecastd t ′ is used to generate dispatch g R-ED it ′ . There is no guarantee that π R-LMP t ′ is high enough to compensate the loss incurred in interval t, hence the missing payment problem.
To provide dispatch-following incentives under forecasting uncertainty, we need stronger equilibrium conditions. Definition 2 (Partial equilibrium and strong equilibrium). Consider price vector π = (π 1 , · · · , π T ) and generation matrix G over the entire scheduling horizon H . The pricedispatch pair (π t , g[t]) in interval t is a partial equilibrium if it satisfies the market clearing and individual rationality conditions in interval t: 1) Market clearing condition:
2) Individual rationality condition: for all i, the dispatch of signal g it is the solution of the individual profit maximization: maximize
The price-generation pair (π, G) is a strong equilibrium and π a strong equilibrium price supporting G if (π t , g t ) is a partial equilibrium for all t.
The notion of partial equilibrium used here is slightly different from the standard because of the sequential nature of multi-interval dispatch and pricing problems. At time t, the dispatch in interval t is necessarily constrained by the past dispatch. The dispatch in the future intervals are advisory and subject to change, which is the reason that only the ramping constraints from the previous interval is imposed.
The strong equilibrium conditions impose stricter constraints than that required by the general and partial equilibrium definitions. Unlike the case of a general equilibrium price that only needs to satisfy the rationality condition at the end of the scheduling horizon, a strong equilibrium price must provide dispatch-following incentive in every interval independent of future realized dispatches. Consequently, even if schedules and prices may change, for the binding interval, there is no incentive for the generator to deviate from the dispatch signal.
It should not be a surprise that a general equilibrium price may not satisfy the strong equilibrium condition; we have already pointed out that, while π LMP is a general equilibrium price, a generator may be underpaid in a particular interval, as demonstrated in the examples in Sec. V.
Are there some other uniform prices that satisfy the strong equilibrium conditions?
Theorem 2 (Strong equilibrium and uniform price). Let d = d be the actual demand and G ED the one-shot economic dispatch over H . Suppose that the primal and dual optimal solutions of (2) are unique. If there exists a generator i and an interval t such that, under the one-shot economic dispatch, 1) generator i is marginal, i.e., 0 < g ED it <ḡ it , and 2) the ramping constraint of (g ED it ) between interval t − 1 and t is not binding and that between interval t and t + 1 binding with positive multipliers, then, for all uniform prices π, (G ED , π) cannot be a strong equilibrium.
The conditions above on the one-shot economic dispatch are relatively mild; they are easily satisfied for stochastic demand over a sufficiently large T . The significance of Theorem 2 is that all uniform prices suffer from the lack of dispatch-following incentives. As a result, out-of-the-market uplifts are necessary to ensure that generators follow the dispatch signal.
C. Out-of-the-market settlements
The out-of-the-market settlement, also known as uplift, is a process for the operator to compensate market participants for inadequate payment due to inaccurate, incomplete, or nonconvex models. Well known examples are the presence of integer variables in the scheduling and pricing process such as that in the unit commitment problem [9] , [11] , [23] .
Out-of-the-market settlements are in general discriminative and determined in ex-post over the entire scheduling horizon H . Two popular schemes are the make-whole (MW) settlement used in most ISOs in the U.S. and the lost-ofopportunity-cost (LOC) settlement implemented in ISONE.
Let π be the price vector over H and g i = (g i1 , · · · , g iT ) the generation of generator i. The MW payment MW(π, g i ) and the LOC payment LOC(π, g i ) for generator i are defined by, respectively, (6) where Q i (π) is the maximum profit the generator would have received if the generator self-schedule for the given price π:
The following property states that, with uplifts, a generator always has nonnegative total surplus and LOC payment is always no smaller than the MW payment. Proposition 1. Let (π, g) be a price-generation pair over the entire scheduling horizon H and S(π, g) its in-market surplus, i.e.,
where f t (·) is the generation cost function in interval t. If Q(π) in (7) is non-negative, then LOC(π, g) ≥ MW(π, g).
The following proposition, an immediate consequence of the general equilibrium condition, shows that the LOC uplift is a measure of the disincentives of generators to follow the dispatch.
Proposition 2 (LOC and general equilibrium). A dispatch matrix-price pair (G = [g 1 , · · · , g N ] ⊺ ], π) satisfies the general equilibrium condition if and only if the LOC uplifts for all generators are zero.
IV. TEMPORAL LOCATIONAL MARGINAL PRICE
Because uniform pricing cannot provide dispatchfollowing incentives in general, we now consider nonuniform pricing mechanisms. To this end, we extend LMP to the temporal locational marginal price (TLMP) and establish that TLMP is a strong equilibrium price.
A. TLMP: a generalization of LMP
TLMP is derived based on the principle of marginal cost pricing but allowing individualized prices for generators and demand. When pricing generation from generator i, we treat generator i as a negative demand and pay generator i at the marginal benefit of its generation. Roughly speaking, generator i is paid at the marginal cost when it reduces 1 MW of its generation.
We first consider the one-shot TLMP defined over H ; the rolling-window TLMP follows the same way as the rollingwindow LMP.
We define a parameterized economic dispatch by treating g it as a parameter rather than a decision variable in (2) . Let the partial cost be
which excludes the cost of generator i in interval t. The parameterized economic dispatch is defined by (2) with F it (G) as the cost function and {g i ′ t ′ , (i ′ , t ′ ) = (i, t)} as its decision variables.
Definition 3 (TLMP). The TLMP for the demand in interval t is defined by the marginal cost of meeting the demand:
The TLMP for generator i in interval t is defined by the marginal benefit of generator i at g it = g ED it :
Proposition 3 gives the explicit TLMP expressions.
Proposition 3. Let G ED be the solution of the multi-interval economic dispatch in (2) and (λ * t , µ * t ,μ * t , ρ * t ,ρ * t ) the dual variables associated with the constraints.
The TLMP for the demand in interval t is given by
The TLMP for the generator i in interval t is given by
where ∆ * it = ∆µ * it − ∆µ * i(t−1) , and ∆µ * it :=μ * it − µ * it . Proposition 3 reveals the structure of TLMP as a natural extension of LMP.
First, the expression of TLMP in (9) shows a decomposition of π TLMP it into the standard LMP λ * t and individualized ramping prices ∆ * it := ∆µ * it − ∆µ * i(t−1) . When ramping constraints are not binding, TLMP is LMP. Note that this decomposition is analogues to the decomposition of LMP into energy and congestion prices.
Second, we can view TLMP as the standard LMP λ * with a special uplift payment t ∆ it g it computed "in the market." The uplifted price ∆ * it represents the marginal benefit of generator i's ramping capability. Note, however, that ∆ * it may be positive or negative.
Finally, the individual ramping price ∆ it has an interpretation of being the premium for the ramping-induced lost-ofopportunity cost. See discussions of Example I in Sec. V.
B. Dispatch-Following Incentives of TLMP
We now consider the equilibrium and dispatch-following properties. Because TLMP is a nonuniform pricing, the general and partial equilibrium definitions given in the previous section need to be generalized slightly.
• In stead of having a single price vector for all generator, we now have individualized price vector π i for each generator i. • The individual rationality conditions extend naturally by replacing π t in (3-4) by π it .
Theorem 3 for TLMP mirrors Theorem 1 for LMP.
Theorem 3 (One-shot TLMP as a strong equilibrium price). When there is no forecast error, i.e.,d = d, the one-shot multi-interval economic dispatch policy G ED and the TLMP policy P TLMP form a strong equilibrium, thus there is no incentive for any generator to deviate from the economic dispatch signal. In addition, the one-shot TLMP guarantees revenue adequacy for the operator with total merchandising surplus equal to the ramping charge:
The intuition behind the above theorem is evident from a dual perspective of the economic dispatch. Specifically, the Lagrangian of the one-shot economic dispatch (2) with the optimal multipliers can be written as
where the rest of the terms above are independent of g it . It then becomes evident that, with TLMP π TLMP it := λ * t + ∆ * it , the optimal dispatch g * it should always satisfy the individual rationality condition for all i and t.
The positive merchandising surplus and (10) are also not surprising; they are entirely analogous to the same property for LMP when network congestions occur.
What happens when the load forecasts are not accurate? More importantly, is the rolling-window TLMP a strong equilibrium price for the rolling-window dispatch?
Theorem 4 (Rolling-window TLMP as a strong equilibrium price). Letd t = (d t , · · · ,d t+W −1 ) be the W -window load forecast at time t withd t = d t andd t ′ arbitrary for t ′ > t. Let g R-ED i be the rolling window dispatch for generator i and π R-ED i its rolling-window TLMP. Then, for all i, (g R-ED i , π R-TLMP ) forms a strong equilibrium, and
The above theorem highlights the most significant property of TLMP for practical situations when the load forecast used in the rolling-window dispatch are not perfect. There is no uniform pricing policy can achieve the same.
V. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
We consider two toy examples involving T = 3 intervals, one for the one-shot dispatch and pricing policies with perfect load forecasts, the other for the rolling-window policies with inaccurate forecasts. The parameters of the generators are the same for both examples and shown in Table II . Table II shows the generator parameters, one-shot economic dispatch, one-shot LMP, and one-shot TLMP under perfect load forecasts. We make the following observations: 1) In interval t = 1, G2 is scheduled to generate at LMP of $25/MW below its marginal cost of $30/MW because of the ramping requirement. For G2 to ramp at the limit of 50MW to 90MW in the next interval, it incurs an opportunity cost of $5 × 40 = $200 that is not covered by the LMP. This cost is compensated, however, in interval t = 2 when G2, as a marginal generator, is paid at $5/MW above its marginal cost of $30/MW. By the general equilibrium property of LMP, there is no incentive for G2 to deviate from the dispatch. 2) In contrast to LMP, TLMP pays G2 up-front the opportunity cost by adding the price of opportunity cost of $5/MW to the energy price of $25/MW. The upfront payment removes the incentive for G2 to deviate. For this reason, the discriminative part of TLMP in (9) has an interpretation as the premium for the rampinginduced opportunity cost.
A. Example I: one-shot dispatch and pricing
3) The under-payment to G2 in interval t = 1 shows that the one-shot LMP is not a partial equilibrium price in t = 1. Thus LMP is not a strong equilibrium price. Furthermore, the binding ramping constraint for G2 at t = 1 satisfies the condition in Theorem 2. Therefore, no uniform strong-equilibrium price exists. Table III shows the rolling-window economic dispatch and rolling-window prices with window size W = 2. The load forecastsd t = (d t ,d t+1 ) are listed andd t = d t being the actual load. Note thatd t contains forecast errors.
B. Example II: rolling-window dispatch and pricing
The following observations are in order. 1) The rolling-window dispatch is not optimal, i.e., G R-ED = G ED . 2) G1 is not constrained in ramping thus is paid at LMP. 3) G2 again is underpaid by π R-LMP 1 in interval t = 1, which gives G2 incentives to deviate from the dispatch. Unlike the one-shot LMP case, the underpayment is never compensated. The missing payment occurs. The underpayment is compensated out of the market. The LOC and MW uplifts to G2 are both $250. 4) For G2 in interval t = 1, given the inaccurate load forecast of 600 for interval t = 2, the rolling-window dispatch computed at t = 1 for interval t = 2 is 100, which makes the ramping constraints from t = 0 to t = 1 and from t = 1 to t = 2 both binding. The Lagrange multipliers associated with these two binding constraints are zero and five, respectively. The TLMP for G2 is therefore $5 above the LMP, which compensates the underpayment of LMP to the level of marginal cost. In interval t = 2, 3, there are no binding ramping constraints for G2. G2 is paid at the LMP. 
VI. CONCLUSION
We have developed a theory for dispatch-following incentives based on concepts of equilibrium prices in competitive markets. Given that there is no uniform pricing mechanism that can guarantee dispatch-following incentives without discriminative out-of-the-market uplifts, a non-uniform pricing mechanism such as TLMP serves as an alternative. As an extension of LMP, TLMP prices generation based on both the energy and the ramping-induced opportunity costs. As a strong equilibrium pricing mechanism, TLMP guarantees dispatch-following incentives under arbitrary forecast errors.
Evaluating pricing schemes in practice must take into account many factors. In [8] , we conduct more careful simulation studies under relevant performance metrics to compare several benchmark pricing schemes.
APPENDIX

A. Preliminaries
We derive a more compact vector-matrix representation of LMP, TLMP and associated representations. For convenience, we focus on scheduling window H = {1, · · · , W }. Let the demand (or forecasted demand) be d = (d 1 , · · · , d W ) be the demand in H , g i = (g i1 , · · · , g iW ) the generation of generator i, and G ⊺ = [g 1 , · · · , g N ] the generation matrix. The W -interval economic dispatch in the vector-matrix form is defined by
is the total cost for generator i, λ = (λ 1 , · · · , λ W ), the vector of dual variables for the equality constraints and (ρ i ,ρ i , µ i ,μ i ) vectors of dual variables for the inequalities associated generator i, and A an upper triangular matrix with −1 as diagonals, 1 as the first off-diagonals, and zero elsewhere.
Let the Lagrangian of G ED be
where ∆µ * i =μ * i − µ * i and ∆ρ * i =ρ * i − ρ * i . The vector form of the multi-interval LMP and TLMP of generator i are given by, respectively,
For the individual rationality condition, for generator i, we have the following profit maximization problem for given price π: 
By the KKT condition, the solution of the above must satisfy ∇f i (g) − π + A ⊺ ∆η + ∆ζ = 0,
where ∆η =η − η and ∆ζ =ζ − ζ.
B. Proof of Theorem 1
Let G ED be the one-shot economic dispatch and π LMP the LMP. The market clearing condition is already satisfied by G ED . The individual rationality condition (17) holds by setting (g = g ED i , ∆η i = ∆µ * i , ∆ζ i = ∆ρ * i ).
C. Proof of Theorem 2
Suppose that (G ED , π) satisfies the strong equilibrium conditions therefore also the the general equilibrium conditions. Let g ED i be the economic dispatch for generator i. We then have g ED i as a solution of (16) from the individual rationality condition. Let η i ,η i , ζ i ,ζ i be a set of Lagrange multipliers associated with g ED i of (16). We then have
where ∆η i =η i − η i and ∆ζ i =ζ i − ζ i . The uniqueness assumption of the dual optimization implies that π = π LMP . Now we show that π LMP = λ * cannot be a strong equilibrium price under the conditions assumed on G ED . Suppose that g ED it satisfies the conditions in Theorem 2. From (14),
where ∆µ * it = 0. But for (G ED , π LMP ) to be a strong equilibrium, g ED it must be the solution of
which contradicts (18) .
D. Proof of Proposition 1
By the definition of MW(π, g), MW(π, g) + S(π, g) = max{0, S(π, g)} ≥ 0.
By the definition of LOC(π, g) with Q(π) is defined in (7), LOC(π, g) + S(π, g) = Q(π) ≥ max{0, S(π, g)} = MW(π, g) + S(π, g).
E. Proof of Proposition 3
TLMP for demandd t is same as LMP; it is defined by the marginal cost of servingd t : π TLMP 0t := ∂ ∂d t F (G ED ) = λ * t .
To compute TLMP for generator i in interval t, consider the modified multi-interval economic dispatch with generator i in interval t fixed at the optimal economic dispatch level, g it = g ED it :
G ′ : minimize {G=[g jk ,(j,k) =(i,t)]} F it (G) subject to for all j = i and t ′ ∈ H {t}
By the envelope theorem, at the optimal solution G * = [g * it ] and (γ * it ,γ ′ * it , η ′ * it ,η ′ * it ) of G ′ to , we have
where, for the last equality, we have λ * it = λ * t , η * it = µ * it at the optimal dispatch defined in (2) .
F. Proof of Theorem 3
We first show that (G ED , (π TLMP i )) satisfies the general equilibrium conditions. Again, we only need to check the individual rationality condition since the economic dispatch G ED already satisfies the market clearing condition as well as all the ramping constraints.
For the individual rationality condition, we consider the optimizationG i (16) with π = π TLMP . Setting η =η = 0 and ∆ζ = ∆ρ * i , by the KKT condition, g ED i is a solution ofG i . Thus (π TLMP i , g ED i ) satisfies the individual rationality condition for all i.
To show that (G ED , (π TLMP
